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Abstract 
While Ankara is the official capital city, Istanbul is known as the city of cultural, financial and business center of Turkey and was 
selected for the Istanbul Financial Center Project. Since Ankara is the capital, all policies and decisions including financial laws 
and regulations, selection and appointment of high level officials of financial authorities have been made in this city under formal 
or informal meetings. However, perspectives of Ankara and Istanbul toward financial issues including dosages of financial 
regulations and selection criteria of high level officials are different from each other. In this respect, following questions have 
been raised: Does this situation have a potential factor to create instability on management and governance of financial 
authorities? Is this a potential weakness for the Istanbul Financial Center Project? Considering the relevant questions, this paper 
has been developed on the following hypothesis: “Being a capital city is a significant / major factor for a financial center.” If the 
hypothesis is proved to be true, then the Istanbul Financial Center Project has a low chance of success. This paper discusses a 
paradox which is not a phenomenon for all countries but emerges from mostly improper institutional structures and governance 
of financial authorities and poor “rule of law” implementations and policies. This research is based on two real world cases.  
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. 
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1. Introduction 
As an emerging country, Turkey has launched a new project in 2009 named “Istanbul Financial Center Project” 
(Strategy and Action Plan for Istanbul International Financial Center Project, 2009). The project is based on the idea 
that Istanbul, as the biggest business city in Turkey can be a global financial center in addition to the established 
ones for the world. Therefore, a lot of strategies have developed and outlined in the official project document.  
 
There are a lot of factors to be considered for being a financial center. Considering all factors, a country may and 
should implement a lot of projects and plans to succeed. In addition to classified factors as in the figure 1, there is 
another factor that might be significant for the success on the way of being a financial center. It is about selection of 
a city as a potential financial center different than the capital city in a country. Therefore, I try to discover whether 
this distinction is significant or not. Thus, this work has been developed on the following hypothesis: “Being a 
capital city in a country is a significant / major factor for a financial center.” If this hypothesis is valid, then there is a 
paradox. In this paper, considering the recent financial policies in Turkey, I have evaluated some questions with 
regard to the difference by viewpoints of a capital city (Ankara) and a major business city (Istanbul) from the 
perspective of the Istanbul Financial Center Project. If this is a paradox, the same paradox might hold for other 
financial centers in different extents. New York is the only city which is not the capital among the top five financial 
centers (The Global Financial Center Index, 2015). Moreover, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo are both 
political and financial centers of their respective territories or countries. Since each country or region has its own 
dimensions, utilizing real world cases, I drive some results for Turkey considering top financial centers in terms of 
rule of law and financial center rankings.  
 
2. Financial Centers, Recent Rankings and Dimensions 
 
There are many factors that are important for cities to be a financial center. The following figure indicates the 
main factors of competitiveness for financial centers (The Global Financial Center Index, 2015). 
Figure 1: Factors of Competitiveness for Financial Centers 
 
Source:  The Global Financial Center Index (2015) 
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Generally major business cities are conducive to financial center ideas. Metropolises are also good candidates. On 
the other hand, characteristics of a country are very important. For example rule of law ranking, political regime, 
democracy level are key factors.  
 
The following table indicates the recent rankings of financial centers in the world. Based on the table data, 
London, New York, Hong Kong, Singapore and Tokyo take first places in the rankings. New York, similar to 
Istanbul by location, is not the capital. However, it is in second place now and it was in first place previously.  
 
Table 1: Financial Centers and Their Rankings, September 2015 
Centers Rank 
GFCI 18 
Rank 
GFCI 17 
Change 
London 1 2 +1 
New York 2 1 -1 
Hong Kong 3 3 - 
Singapore 4 4 - 
Tokyo 5 5 - 
Seoul 6 7 +1 
Zurich 7 6 -1 
Toronto 8 11 +3 
San Francisco 9 8 -1 
Washington DC 10 12 +2 
Chicago 11 9 -2 
Boston 12 10 -2 
Geneva 13 13 - 
Frankfurt 14 19 +5 
Sydney 15 21 +6 
Dubai 16 23 +7 
Source:  The Global Financial Center Index (2015) 
 
 
188   Ibrahim Ethem Sancak /  Procedia Economics and Finance  38 ( 2016 )  185 – 194 
Istanbul is in the 47th place. This place is odd for Istanbul since Turkey is a member of the Group of Twenty.  
 
On the other hand, Istanbul is not alone on the capital city-financial city issue. Out of the top 20, 13 centers are 
not capital city. 
 
Table 2: Top Centers; Not Capital City 
Ranking Financial Center Country Capital City 
2 New York U.S. Washington DC 
7 Zurich Switzerland Bern 
8 Toronto Canada Ottawa 
9 San Francisco U.S. Washington DC 
11 Chicago U.S. Washington DC 
12 Boston U.S. Washington DC 
13 Geneva Switzerland Bern 
14 Frankfurt Germany Berlin 
15 Sydney Australia Canberra 
16 Dubai United Arab Emirates Abu Dhabi 
17 Montreal Canada Ottawa 
18 Vancouver Canada Ottawa 
20 Osaka Japan Tokyo 
Source: The Global Financial Center Index (2015). 
 
Table 3: Top Centers; Capital City 
Ranking Financial Center Country Capital City 
1 London U.K. London 
3 Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong 
4 Singapore Singapore Singapore 
5 Tokyo Japan Tokyo 
6 Seoul South Korea Seoul 
10 Washington DC U.S. Washington DC 
19 Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg 
Source: The Global Financial Center Index (2015). 
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It is apparent that not being a capital city is not significant in terms of being a top financial center. An important 
factor is that political power is related to the financial center.  Turkey has entered into a new horizon since 2003. In 
this period, Turkey has had Ankara oriented policies with stronger political power and weakening institutional 
structure. The new period since 2003 has resulted in stronger centralized policies. Therefore, law issues have come 
up front.  
 
Rule of law is strongly related to political power.  It is also a factor that affects financial center rankings. Table 4 
indicates main areas and issues of competitiveness.  
 
Table 4: Main Issues of Competitiveness, WJP Rule of Law Index  
Area of Competitiveness Number of Mentions Main Issues 
Business Environment 201 x Corruption 
x Rule of Law 
Taxation 164 x Simplicity and fairness 
x Stability & transparency 
Human Capital 146 x Centers becoming more competitive in attracting skilled people 
x Diversity of nationalities is become more important 
Reputation 116 x Security and safety are becoming more important 
x Centers need to market themselves more – they are in a competitive 
marketplace 
Infrastructure 106 x People are becoming less patient and don't want to wait for 
transportation 
x ICT infrastructure is now a given – without it a center cannot compete 
Financial Sector  
Development 
100 
 
x Professional service clusters are vital 
x Physical proximity is still very important 
Source: WJP, WJP Rule of Law Index (2015) 
Table 5 brings together financial center rankings with rule of law index rankings.  
Table 5: Financial Center Rankings & Rule of Law Index† Rankings 
Financial Center 
Ranking 
Financial Center Country Rule of Law Ranking 
1 London U.K. 12 
2 New York U.S. 19 
3 Hong Kong Hong Kong 17 
4 Singapore Singapore 9 
5 Tokyo Japan 13 
6 Seoul South Korea 11 
7 Zurich Switzerland NA 
8 Toronto Canada 14 
9 San Francisco U.S. 19 
10 Washington DC U.S. 19 
 
† The WJP Rule of Law Index relies on over 100,000 household and 2,400 expert surveys to measure how the rule of law is experienced in 
practical, everyday situations by ordinary people around the world and it is the most comprehensive index of its kind and the only to rely solely 
on primary data (WJP, WJP Rule of Law Index, 2015). 
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11 Chicago U.S. 19 
12 Boston U.S. 19 
13 Geneva Switzerland NA 
14 Frankfurt Germany 8 
15 Sydney Australia 10 
16 Dubai United Arab Emirates 27 
17 Montreal Canada 14 
18 Vancouver Canada 14 
19 Luxembourg Luxembourg NA 
20 Osaka Japan 13 
Sources:  The Global Financial Center Index (2015); WJP, WJP Rule of Law Index (2015). 
Except UAE, the top 20 centers have Rule of Law Index rankings better than 20. Table 5 well indicates that there 
is a strong relationship between financial center rankings and “rule of law” index rankings. In other words, “rule of 
law” level is more significant factor than the major business city-capital city factor. Therefore, the rule of law 
dimension is important.  
 
The “rule of law” is a system where the following four universal principles are upheld (WJP, What is the Rule of 
Law? 2016): 
1) The government and its officials and agents as well as individuals and private entities are accountable 
under the law. 
2) The laws are clear, publicized, stable, and just; are applied evenly; and protect fundamental rights, 
including the security of persons and property. 
3) The process by which the laws are enacted, administered, and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient. 
4) Justice is delivered timely by competent, ethical, and independent representatives and neutrals who are of 
sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve. 
Turkey’s recent ranking is 80 for the year of 2015 (WJP, WJP Rule of Law Index, 2015).  The ranking for Turkey 
was 59 for the previous year (WJP, WJP Rule of Law Index, 2014). Similarly, Turkey’s current financial center 
ranking (47) is worse than previous year’s one (42).  
 
3. Literature 
 
There are some indirectly related works on the subject. One of them is the work of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Levine (2001). Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine assess three established theories and propose an augmented 
version of one of the theories about the determinants of financial development (Beck, T., Demirgüç-Kunt, A., & 
Levine, R., 2001). One view and three theories are law and finance theory, dynamic law and finance theory, politics 
and finance theory, and endowment view. The researchers utilize a data set of the period of 1975-1995. Findings are 
consistent with the law and finance theory and the dynamic law and finance theory. According to Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Levine, legal origin is much more powerful variable in explaining development of financial institutions. 
The work of Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2001) is a cross-country analysis. Therefore, the work does not 
consider country specific uses. As a country based analysis, the work of Armour & Lele (2009) on India’s economy 
rejects the theory that legal origins play an important role in financial sector development. Instead, they conclude 
that legal origins may only play a supporting role. The work attributes more importance to politics theory to achieve 
some recent developments in India.  
On the other hand, the works of Gündoğdu & Dizman (2013) and Coşkun (2011) considering the country specific 
issues touch on the Istanbul Financial Center Project. Coşkun (2011) states that political aspects are a driver for the 
project and real dynamics are weaker. Coşkun (2011) also points out that only regulatory perspective is not enough 
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for the success of the project. Coşkun (2011), moreover, addresses a paradox that if a country cannot sustain a 
trustable environment for the residents, it is hard to attract international investors and create a financial center. 
Gündoğdu & Dizman (2013) evaluates the Istanbul Financial Center Project with a SWOT analysis. Together with 
other results, Gündoğdu & Dizman (2013) points out that public impression indicate that the project is much more 
real estate infra-structure project. However, the authors believe that recent regulatory reforms are important steps 
toward the project. Gündoğdu & Dizman (2013) also states that implementations toward the project are not enough 
and the rate of fulfilled projects are lower than the expected one.  
The work of Wood & Waterman (1991) outlines the dynamics of political control of the bureaucracy from the 
U.S.A. perspective. The authors find that political appointments are the most important instrument of the political 
control. This finding increases the importance of rule of law issues.  
Quintyn & Taylor (2002) argues that regulators and supervisors need a substantial degree of independence, both 
from the government and the industry, in order to fulfill their mandate and contribute to the achievement and 
preservation of financial stability. The authors identify following four different dimensions or building blocks that 
together define independence: 
x Regulatory independence, 
x Supervisory independence, 
x Institutional independence,  
x Budgetary independence. 
Quintyn & Taylor (2002) also pins down following dimensions of institutional independence: 
x The terms of appointment and even more critically dismissal of its senior personnel, 
x The agency’s governance structure, 
x The openness and transparency of decision making.  
The work of Quintyn & Taylor (2002) analyzes the regulatory and supervisory environment from the financial 
stability perspective which is a key factor for a financial center. Their works also shed light on cases outlined in this 
paper.  
4. Ankara-Istanbul Paradox: Evidence from Turkish Financial Policies 
4.1. A Real Case 1: Changing the Chairman of the Capital Markets Board of Turkey before the Assigned 
Legal Term 
During the 6th December 2012 meetings of the Turkish Parliament, the deputy prime minister who was 
responsible for economic and financial affairs offered that residing chairman and all commissioners of the Capital 
Markets Board of Turkey (CMB) leave their positions and they be assigned as advisors to a new chairman to be 
appointed (Official Records of The Parliament, Meeting 35/24/36/3, 2012). The offer was accepted and a decision 
was made by the parliament‡. Alleged reasoning of the offer was that the draft law had new rules regarding the 
appointment, legal terms and reappointment of chairman and commissioners; therefore, it was essential that current 
chairman and commissioners quit their job in their positions to be able to appoint a new chairman and new 
commissioners according to the expected new law (Official Records of The Parliament, Meeting 35/24/36/3, 2012). 
In reality, reasoning behind the firing of the chairman of the CMB has been much more different. In practice, there 
 
‡ This paper does not intend to be political, therefore, it does not mention names involved in the real cases. On the other hand, I 
was an observer of the facts.  
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was no need to change the chairman and commissioners and appointment of a new chairman and commissioners was 
improper because of the fact that a completely new law requires an experienced chairman and commissioners to 
implement the new rules. A commission or a board which consists of a new chairman and new commissioners would 
not be comfortable in decision making since newly appointed members would be uninformed about a completely 
new law and its technical aspects, and that situation would create new managerial risks and gaps toward 
implementation of the rules. Therefore, it is obviously a policy mistake when a law has been completely changed by 
an experienced team to replace that team with an inexperienced one.  
 
On the other hand, right after the draft capital markets law passed, two of the former commissioners were 
reappointed as the new commissioners and one of them was appointed as the new chairman of the CMB. 
Appointment of the former commissioners as new ones solely proves that the reasoning has not been ever realistic. 
What makes the case worse was that the newly appointed chairman was under serious allegations. A criminal 
litigation based on an investigation carried out by a public prosecutor was going on about the newly appointed 
chairman at the time.  Allegations were addressing some illegal connections with an alleged group of people 
organized to commit some illegal, illegitimate and criminal actions. The alleged actions were involved in some 
official decisions and duties of the CMB.  
 
During the Parliament meetings on the issue, a parliament member asked “Why are you taking down the 
chairman and other members of the board? What are their faults? If they misbehaved in their duties, why did you not 
take administrative actions (instead of deploying the parliament’s power)?” (Official Records of the Parliament, 
Meeting 35/24/36/3, 2012).  
 
It is obviously a rule of law issue that a bureaucrat is being promoted by the government while there is a very 
serious criminal case against him and while investigations are ongoing about that bureaucrat. According to the 
Turkish Constitution of 1982, executive, legislative and judicial powers are equal and neither of them is superior to 
the other one. Knowing this basic constitutional rule, the government signals a pressure on the judiciary power by 
promoting a commissioner as the chairman of the CMB and indirectly sends signals to the court that “I do not 
believe that the commissioner is guilty”, which is a serious governmental policy mistake in a rule of law country. 
Moreover, it is obvious that promoting a commissioner who is already under a serious criminal investigation 
undermines the trust and harms the confidence toward economic institutions.  
 
This case is very indicative of the paradox. The former Chairman of the CMB was more inclined to work in 
Istanbul. He spent most of his time in Istanbul and only visited Ankara occasionally. On the other hand, the new 
chairman had lived in Ankara and had chance of having strong political connections.  
 
There were no any allegations about the former chairman. Moreover, the former chairman was and is a prominent 
finance professor. However, the Ankara-Istanbul Paradox was so clear that it had replaced a chairman who was 
carrying out his duty without any improper or illegal action with a commissioner who worked with the same 
chairman but who was under a criminal investigation, even though the legally designated term didn’t end. The 
legally designated term was six years for the former chairman. When the case took place, the former chairman had 
about two and half years to serve.  
 
Firing a high level official like a chairman of an independent regulatory and supervisory agency before the legally 
designated term under the Quintyn & Taylor (2002) works is a breach of institutional independence. Independence is 
best served if there are clear rules on hiring and firing. Under the rules, regulators would enjoy security of tenure, 
enabling them to take action without fear of dismissal by the government (Quintyn & Taylor, 2002). 
4.2. A Real Case 2: Changing the CEO of the Istanbul Stock Exchange (Borsa Istanbul, BIST) before the 
Assigned Legal Term 
Borsa Istanbul, Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) has been a state-owned enterprise. The CEO of the ISE or Borsa 
Istanbul has been appointed for a legal term and was supposed to serve until the term ends. In 2011, the CEO of the 
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ISE was fired by the ruling government about one year before the term ended (KHK/662, Government Decree in the 
power of law, 2011). Firing the CEO of the ISE was a surprise at the time. There were no grounds for the decision 
from the CEO perspective. Based on the news and declarations, it was obvious that the CEO wanted to serve and 
fulfill the legal term, even one more term after that. The CEO of the Borsa Istanbul later was hired by the World 
Federation of Exchanges (WFE) and appointed as secretary general and later CEO of the WFE (Reuters, 2012). 
These appointments by the WFE were clear indications that the CEO has the capacity to serve at the ISE or the 
Borsa Istanbul and there were no grounds to fire him§. This case was a cornerstone just before the bigger case of the 
firing the chairman of the CMB. This case is also an indication of the Ankara-Istanbul paradox.  
5. Results  
Based on the analyses and real cases, two groups of results have come out: 
Result 1: Rule of law is one of the primary drivers for competitive financial centers 
 Turkey should score a better place in Rule of Law Index Rankings to have a competitive financial center.  
 It is impossible to have a financial center globally without a good ranking and a positive impression.  
Result 2: Capital city and business city issue is not the primary factor that impedes the potential success.  
 Having financial center located at a different place than a capital city is not a problem or an obstacle per se. 
However, this is a serious obstacle for countries that have low profile in rule of law standards.  
 Different perspectives between Ankara and Istanbul are serious obstacle for the success of the Istanbul 
Financial Center Project.  
6. Conclusion 
There is no evidence that a different location of capital city and business city is the primary factor that impedes 
the potential success for a financial center. However, rule of law issues are more significant. In this respect, Turkey 
inherently does not have a paradox of the capital city, Ankara, and the major business city, Istanbul by location. In 
fact, Turkey apparently has rule of law issues that produce the paradox as an externality, and this paradox feeds a 
vicious circle and worsens the rankings and impedes the potential competitiveness. 
 
Therefore, the preliminary findings of this research indicate that the hypothesis of “Being a capital city is a 
significant / major factor for a financial center” is neither true for Turkey nor another country. However, much more 
research is needed for more robust results and a cross country analysis may be helpful to go beyond this work.  
 
As for a solution for the apparent Ankara-Istanbul paradox, Turkish policymakers should attribute more 
importance to increasing the rule of law level to be able to have a competitive financial center.  
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§ At the time, the Chairman of the WFE Board of Directors said (Reuters, 2012): “WFE has a long-standing commitment to 
bringing the world’s regulated exchanges together in order to improve the quality of markets. Our Board of Directors believes 
that Hüseyin will strengthen and focus the WFE’s voice as it proactively fulfills its promise to promote market fairness and 
transparency worldwide.” The aforementioned secretary general, the former CEO of the ISE, was appointed as CEO of the WFE 
in 2012 (WFE, 2012).  
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